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UNION COMPETITION AND STRIKES: 
THE NEED FOR ANALYSIS AT THE SECTOR LEVEL 
AGNES AKKERMAN* 
International comparative research has found that strike incidence is higher where 
two or more unions bargain with an employer ("multi-unionism"), as is common in 
most European countries, than where only one union does, all else equal. Two pro 
posed explanations for this relationship, both invoking inter-union rivalry as the main 
dynamic, are that under multi-unionism, unions (a) make propagandistic use of strikes 
to attract members, or (b) compete with each other by bidding up bargaining demands. 
To date, the evidence bearing on these hypotheses has been equivocal because, the 
author argues, researchers have focused on activity at the national level rather than at 
the lower levels that are more commonly the nexus for strike formation. The author 
performs empirical tests using industry-sector-level data for seven European countries 
for the years 1990-2006, and finds evidence clearly favoring the competitive bargaining 
hypothesis over the propaganda hypothesis. 
T n this study, I seek to explain a paradoxical 
-*- effect of multi-unionism on strike inci 
dence: although union power within bar 
gaining structures is lower when two or more 
unions negotiate with the employer (the defi 
nition of "multi-unionism") than when only 
one does, the mainly comparative studies of 
this subject report higher strike activity under 
multi-unionism. Unlike in the United States, 
where multi-unionism disappeared after the 
Wagner Act in 1935 (Gould 2004:29), exclu 
sive jurisdiction is the exception in Europe 
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(Visser 1992). There, it is very common for 
more than one union to be recognized as a 
bargaining partner by the employer, both 
at the level of the individual firm and at the 
sector level. At the national level, multi 
unionism can be caused by the division of 
worker representation between two or more 
union confederations. Of the 27 European 
Union member states, 85% have more than 
one labor union confederation; Hungary, 
at the extreme, has six. Most labor union 
confederations are divided along political 
(50%), religious (25%), or occupational (sta 
tus) lines (25%), or a combination of these 
three (Eurofound 2006, 2007). Even in the 
four countries with just one union confedera 
tion?the United Kingdom, Austria, Ireland, 
and Latvia?multi-union bargaining is not 
unknown: unaffiliated unions and union 
representation by several unions within the 
same confederation are found in all four of 
these nations. Thus, the industrial relations 
environment in Europe differs sharply from 
that in North America, where one particular 
union has the exclusive right to represent 
employees in a particular firm. 
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Both theoretical and empirical studies 
point to dramatic economic consequences 
of multi-unionism. Multi-unionism has been 
found to elevate unemployment, reduce 
efficiency among firms, restrain productiv 
ity growth, push wages up, and, above all, 
increase strike incidence.1 The main body 
of literature, consisting of cross-national 
comparative analyses of strikes, suggests 
a 
relationship between strike incidence and the 
number of confederations within a country. 
Countries with more than one confedera 
tion experience higher rates of strikes than 
do those with a single confederation. Most 
of these studies explicitly or implicitly posit 
that this higher incidence of strikes can be 
explained by the propagandistic value of 
strikes to labor unions, which compete with 
one another for membership. The higher 
incidence of strikes is thus attributed to union 
rivalry. A second, smaller body of literature 
is based mainly on economic analysis. These 
studies, which all concern U.K. industrial 
relations, find that the number of unions 
bargaining with an employer is linked both 
to economic output and to the incidence 
of industrial conflict. Like the other, larger 
set of studies, these studies identify union 
rivalry as a possible cause of industrial 
conflict. However, this second school of 
thought differs considerably from the first in 
its underlying reasoning: the main spur to 
strike activity is not the propagandistic value 
of strikes, but rather "inter-union jealousy" 
and a lack of cooperation between unions, 
which together encourage unions to drive 
up wage demands (Oswald 1979). These 
two hypotheses contradict each other in 
their analyses of the mechanisms by which 
multi-unionism leads to competition between 
unions, and hence to more strike activity. 
*For multi-unionism's effects on unemployment, 
inefficiency, and product growth, see Pohjola (1984); 
for its effects on wages and strike incidence, see Webb 
and Webb 1897; Galenson 1940; Ross and Irwin 1951; 
Gitlow 1952; Lester 1958; Ross and Hartman 1960; 
Krislov 1960; Clegg 1976; Freeman and Britain 1977; 
Korpi and Shalev 1979; Visser 1987; Franzosi 1989; 
Battista 1991; Cohn 1993; Ingram et al. 1993; Machin 
et al. 1993; Franzosi 1995; and Stout 1995. 
Does the higher strike incidence result from 
competition for members, or from competing 
wage demands? Competition for members 
would be relevant only among unions without 
strictly demarcated membership bases, whose 
potential membership therefore overlaps. 
Inter-union competition expressed through 
wage demands, in contrast, would be relevant 
among unions with distinct memberships. 
In this article I attempt to reinvigorate 
the study of labor union competition and 
its impact on strike incidence by examining 
the theoretical paradox of multi-unionism, 
and testing the two contradictory hypotheses 
presented above. I also aim at improving the 
methods used by traditional cross-national 
studies to test the relationship between the 
number of labor unions and strike frequency. 
Traditional tests have been flawed because 
both their dependent variable?strike fre 
quency?and their independent variable? 
competition between labor unions?have 
been measured by indicators at the national 
level, whereas most strikes and competition 
between labor unions occur at the sub-na 
tional level, such as within industrial sectors 
or individual companies. Finally, this study, 
which investigates seven countries and four 
industrial sectors, represents a significant 
expansion of the empirical research and goes 
beyond the one-sector, one-country, unified 
labor-movement studies that economists have 
conducted exclusively in Britain. This will 
enable a cross-sector evaluation of the two 
competition hypotheses in countries with a 
divided labor movement. 
The Empirical Status 
of Union Competition 
Ross and Irwin (1951) and Ross and 
Hartman (1960) are classic studies of strike 
activity. On the basis of their research into 
strikes in five countries, Ross and Irwin con 
cluded that strike levels seemed to increase in 
countries where the labor force was divided 
into multiple federations and to decrease 
when a unified labor force was present. In 
the latter countries, strikes were eventually 
expected to disappear. In a more extensive 
follow-up study in 1960, Ross and Hartman 
tested their thesis of the "withering away" of 
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strikes in countries with a unified labor force. 
Although all fifteen of the countries studied 
showed decreasing strike activity, they also 
displayed remarkably divergent levels of strike 
activity. One explanation for this divergence 
was the existence of a divided labor move 
ment, which implies competition between 
unions for members. Continuous competi 
tion for better settlements would encourage 
strikes. Labor unions attract new members 
by negotiating better working conditions, 
and the presence of several labor unions is 
likely to drive up their demands: 
Rival unionism is a potent cause of strikes where 
rivalry is pursued on the basis of comparative 
militancy in pressing grievances and comparative 
gains in collective bargaining. A labour organi 
zation must attempt to match the achievements 
of its rival or rivals and must secure even greater 
benefits, if possible, regardless of the amount of 
resistance to be overcome. (Ross and Hartman 
1960:65-66) 
Ross and Hartman distinguished two dimen 
sions of strike activity: strike frequency and 
strike duration. Ranking the fifteen countries 
under investigation, they observed four pat 
terns of strike activity: two Northern Euro 
pean patterns, displaying low levels of strike 
frequency; and a Northern American pattern 
and Mediterranean-Asian pattern, displaying 
higher strike frequency. These patterns seem 
to reveal a clear positive association between 
the incidence of strikes and the presence of 
a divided labor movement. 
However, the presence of a divided labor 
movement alone was insufficient to explain 
the observed incidence of strikes: some of 
the countries with a divided labor movement 
had high strike incidence, and some did not. 
The Netherlands was the exception to the 
Northern European pattern: it had a highly 
divided labor movement, yet displayed low 
strike frequency. Although the labor unions 
of the Netherlands and France had compa 
rable religious and political divisions, the 
peaceful cooperation among Dutch labor 
unions was in stark contrast to the inter-union 
rivalry in France. Thus, there must be more 
to the observed relationship between strike 
frequency and divisions within the labor 
movement than union rivalry. 
The second conclusion of Ross and Hart 
man's empirical study was that no correlation 
existed between strike duration and labor 
movement division. To explain the varia 
tion in strike frequencies within the group 
of countries with a divided labor movement, 
Ross and Hartman introduced an institutional 
factor: cooperation at the national level, 
combined with the possibility of serving 
labor interests in the political arena, would 
reduce the incidence of strikes even in the 
presence of a divided labor movement, they 
hypothesized. Although this explanation 
may hold true for the Netherlands, it seems 
somewhat ad hoc. 
Another author who tried to explain 
anomalies in the assumed relationship be 
tween labor movement divisions and strike 
incidence was Clegg (1976). Also assuming 
union rivalry to be the cause of high strike 
frequencies, Clegg offered institutional fac 
tors to explain exceptions like the Dutch case. 
In particular, based on a theory of collective 
bargaining he developed by comparing the 
experiences of six countries, Clegg asserted 
that the bargaining structure is responsible 
for the observed differences in strike inci 
dence: strikes at lower bargaining levels 
are supposedly cheaper for unions, because 
fewer strikers are needed than at the sector 
or national level. This should explain the 
high strike incidence in the United States, 
where bargaining occurs at the level of indi 
vidual firms. Clegg argued that arbitration 
institutions, such as the Swedish Labor Court 
and the Dutch peace-keeping resolutions, 
account for the remaining variation in strike 
activity among countries with nationally 
based bargaining systems. Strike funds may 
also temper strike frequency. The idea that 
strike funds decrease strike frequency may 
seem paradoxical, but Clegg suggested that 
unions with large strike funds at their disposal 
tend to wish to preserve these savings rather 
than spend them to finance strikes. 
Clegg used these factors to explain the 
differences in strike frequency between, on 
the one hand, France, Australia, and the 
United Kingdom, where strike frequency 
was high, and, on the other hand, Germany 
and Sweden, where strike frequency was 
low. However, this could not explain the 
high levels of strikes in the United States, 
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which had conflict resolution mechanisms 
comparable to Germany's and Sweden's 
(Clegg 1976:71). According to Clegg, union 
rivalry explains this anomaly. Rivalry within 
and between unions (especially in France) 
pushed up the incidence of strikes. The high 
incidence of strikes was an interaction effect 
of company-level bargaining and inter-union 
rivalry. Clegg argued that a decentralized 
bargaining structure leads to fierce competi 
tion within and between labor unions, thus 
implying that union competition is the real 
mechanism producing higher levels of strike 
frequency. 
Korpi and Shalev (1979) also pointed 
to divisions within the labor movement to 
explain the incidence of strikes. They sug 
gested that, rather than institutional factors 
such as the level at which bargaining occurs 
and conflict resolution structures, it is the 
power relations between capital and labor 
that explain strike frequencies. This factor 
determines the institutional arrangement 
within a country, which may facilitate the 
employee representatives' use of the political 
arena for interest representation; this, in turn, 
may reduce open conflict with employers. 
For Korpi and Shalev, the relationship be 
tween strike frequency and labor movement 
divisions depends on a number of political 
factors, one being the way employees are orga 
nized, or, more precisely, whether employees 
are represented by a united front of unions. 
Korpi and Shalev stated that the presence 
of a unified labor front is a precondition for 
influencing political decision-making. A di 
vided labor movement produces a weakened 
labor class, which is less able to influence 
institutional arrangements and is left with 
labor conflict as a last resort: 
A... desideratum is that the working class be char 
acterized by a substantial degree of organizational 
unit, that is coordination between the different 
segments and arms of the labour movement and 
influence over the constituents within them. Un 
less this ... precondition is met, neither capital 
nor the representatives of state would be likely 
to regard political exchange as a credible option. 
(Korpi and Shalev 1979:180) 
From this perspective, the link between 
high strike frequency and a divided labor 
movement is not caused by competition for 
members among unions, as the institutional 
ist approach suggests, but by the failure of 
employees to form a united front when deal 
ing with employers and government. 
Korpi and Shalev developed their theory 
based on a case study of Sweden, then tested 
it through an international comparison of 
18 countries. However, their alternative 
explanation was still equivocal: as in previ 
ous studies, the Netherlands remained an 
unexplained exception. Moreover, Korpi 
and Shalev uncovered a new anomaly: Swit 
zerland. Both countries showed low strike 
activity. In these particular countries, Korpi 
and Shalev suggested, labor is able to use the 
political arena, despite the fact that various 
labor union federations are present. They as 
sumed that in pillarized2 societies, such as the 
Netherlands and Switzerland, the weakness 
of a divided labor movement is compensated 
for by their formation of coalitions with like 
minded political parties. 
In their efforts to explain differences 
in strike activity between countries, the 
comparativists find a relationship between 
divisions in labor movements and strike fre 
quency, which they explain with a mechanism 
on a quite different level. Only Korpi and 
Shalev cited national-level factors to explain 
the relationship; both Clegg and the team 
of Ross and Hartman attributed differences 
in national strike levels to sector-level-com 
petition between unions. Competition on 
the national level may have been relevant at 
the time of their studies, but it is certainly 
not the level at which most bargaining takes 
place in today's Europe. Due to processes of 
decentralization in most Western European 
states, most bargaining now takes place at the 
sector or company level (Traxler et al. 2001 ). 
In essence, competition for members does 
not refer to divisions between central union 
^Pillarization" refers to a vertically divided society, 
split along religious or ideological lines (or both), with 
each group having its own "pillar": for example, the 
Catholic, Protestant, and Socialist pillars, each of which 
had its own political parties, labor unions, broadcasting 
associations, schools, and other institutions. Examples of 
pillarization are the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium. 
Pillarized entities are also referred to as "consociational"; 
seeLijphart (1968). 
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confederations, but resembles what in British 
strike research is called "multi-unionism." 
Although the United Kingdom is not 
characterized by a divided labor movement, 
multi-unionism is common in British plants 
and companies (Machin et al. 1993), and 
the United Kingdom, surprisingly, is the only 
country for which internationally published 
research has been conducted on the effects of 
multi-unionism. Several studies have investi 
gated the effect of multi-unionism on strikes 
in the United Kingdom and have found a 
positive relationship (Stewart 1987; Ingram 
et al. 1993; Machin et al. 1993). The effect 
of multi-unionism is particularly strong in 
manufacturing (Dobson 1997). In the case 
of the United Kingdom, multi-unionism is not 
caused by political or religious splits among 
unions; at the national level no such splits 
exist in the unions confederation. Although 
multi-unionism in the United Kingdom is 
not a simple phenomenon, and has been 
especially difficult to characterize since the 
waves of mergers of small unions into large 
"general" unions (Edwards et al. 1992:38; 
Ebbinghaus and Waddington 2000:706-16), 
fundamentally it is rooted in the organization 
of different groups of workers by specific 
unions. The lack of coordination over bar 
gaining claims and the presence of "inter 
unionjealousy" encourage unions to compete 
by driving up wage demands (Oswald 1979). 
This explains the association between higher 
wage levels and multi-unionism, but does not 
explain the observed higher strike incidence 
under multi-unionism. 
The Need for a Comparison 
Based on a Sector-Level Analysis 
The strike frequency studies I have dis 
cussed are alike in concluding that there is 
a positive relationship between divided labor 
movements and strike frequencies. Never 
theless, persistent anomalies have occurred, 
and these have repeatedly been explained by 
the presumed dampening effect of national 
institutional factors. Although these sug 
gestions have surface plausibility, they do 
not offer a systematic explanation for the 
observed relationship. 
At least two factors account for the am 
biguous empirical results of investigations 
into the relationship between a divided labor 
movement and strike frequencies. The first 
factor is theorists' oversimplification of the 
effect of competition, and the second factor 
involves methodological issues. 
Theoretical Considerations 
Comparative studies suggest competition 
as the main cause of the observed positive 
relationship between multi-unionism and 
strikes. The argument that strikes are used 
as a marketing tool is compelling, and the 
suggested effect seems plausible at face value. 
Closer examination, however, reveals a para 
dox. This paradox can best be understood 
when we view the union's decision to engage 
in industrial conflict from the perspective of 
the leadership. The leadership will assess the 
potential benefits of a strike. This judgment 
will be based on (a) the potential value of 
the concession from the employer?which 
may consist of improvements, like wage 
increases, or the prevention of a deteriora 
tion in employment conditions?and (b) the 
probability that a strike will succeed in forc 
ing the employer to make such a concession 
(Hicks 1963). The labor union assesses the 
probability of such a concession on the basis 
of, among other things, its bargaining power 
and the bargaining power of the employer. 
Assuming that a union's membership is an 
important determinant of its bargaining 
power (see Britt and Galle 1972; Crouch 
1982; Gramm 1986; Martin 1992), this implies 
that a labor union in competition with other 
unions has to share its potential bargaining 
power with other unions (Akkerman et al. 
1995 ). This problem will tend to weaken such 
a union's bargaining power, irrespective of 
the power of the employer (assuming that the 
total rate of unionization is constant). The 
probability of winning a strike will therefore 
be smaller for unions that negotiate within 
a bargaining unit in which more than one 
union operates. The reduced chances of 
winning a strike will reduce the expected 
utility of a strike for these unions. 
A possible effect of this weakened posi 
tion is reduced effectiveness of strikes under 
multi-unionism. For example, an employer 
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who is aware that a union is weakened by this 
dynamic may force the union into a strike. 
However, the ultimate decision to call a strike 
rests with the union, which is not likely to take 
the fatal step of initiating a foredoomed strike. 
An unsuccessful strike would not improve the 
membership's trust in the union in the long 
run and would be an implausible strategy for 
a union to follow in order to retain or enlarge 
its membership. A more plausible effect of 
the reduced expected utility of striking is 
therefore a reduced incidence of strikes. By 
this reasoning, union splits should reduce 
rather than increase strike activity. 
Two other considerations, however, would 
lead to the opposite expectation, namely, that 
union splits should result in higher strike 
incidence. First, union splits are likely to 
result from divergent interests. These di 
vergent interests create various, sometimes 
even contradictory, claims, which the em 
ployer may not be able to fulfill (Machin et 
al. 1993:283). This increases the probability 
that the demands of at least one of the unions 
will not be satisfied, thereby increasing the 
probability of a strike. Moreover, the 
em 
ployer, who is not fully informed even when 
bargaining with one union, will face further 
informational difficulties when assessing the 
costs and probabilities of the unions' strate 
gies. The employer needs to assess not only 
the probability of a strike by one or other of 
the unions, but also the probability of the 
unions cooperating in a strike. This increases 
the scope for misjudgments, which again 
results in a higher probability of a strike. In 
cases where rival strikes occur, these would 
orginate from substantive reasons: unfulfilled 
bargaining claims. The effect of multi-unionism 
should therefore be greater in heterogeneous sectors 
where workers 
' 
interests diverge the most (hypoth 
esis I). (Machin et al. 1993.) 
An alternative explanation for the paradox 
is that labor's weakness may drive unions 
into a struggle to survive. In this struggle, 
maintaining and increasing the membership 
is of vital importance to unions, and this im 
perative may encourage them to compete for 
members. Unions may compete for new, as 
yet unaffiliated workers, but equally for each 
other's existing members. Indeed, the first 
category may be more difficult to win over 
than the second, since existing members of 
other unions have already shown their will 
ingness to engage in unionism. Any overlap 
in (potential) membership will increase the 
chances of a strike. Overlap can be based on 
similarities in occupation, job level, political 
background, and so on. In this case, rival 
strikes would orginate not from substantive 
motives, but purely from membership compe 
tition. Ifthisistrue, the effect of multi-unionism 
will be stronger in homogeneous sectors, where the 
overlap in membership is largest (hypothesis II). 
(Akkerman 1997.) 
At the same time, multi-unionism does 
not by definition rule out the possibility of 
cooperation between unions. When inter 
ests converge and overlap in membership 
is absent or only moderate, unions may 
see opportunities to join forces. They may 
jointly bargain with the employer (that is, 
engage in "single-table bargaining"; Chaison 
1996:86), and may decide to join forces in 
calling a strike. In fact, cooperation 
can also 
be the result of severe competition: unions 
may imitate each other and all call a strike 
in order to prevent their members from 
defecting to their rivals on strike. In such 
situations competition causes involuntary 
"cooperation" (Akkerman 2000). Whatever 
the motives for cooperation are, for the argu 
ment of this article it is important to establish 
its consequences. The bargaining situations 
in which all unions cooperate, in fact acting 
as one union, will lead, ceteris paribus, to the 
same strike probabilities as the single-union 
situation, theoretically. 
Methodological Issues 
International comparisons have suffered 
not only from a limited theoretical base, 
but also from three methodological limita 
tions. First, the international comparisons 
I have discussed may have been distorted by 
conflict-dampening or conflict-intensifying 
factors at the national level. Ross and Hart 
man have already explored the possibility 
of dampening factors at the national level. 
Although the presence of such factors may 
reduce the number of strikes, they do not 
nullify the relationship entirely. Even where 
strike frequencies are low by international 
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comparison, the strikes that do occur may 
still be caused by competition. 
Second, the studies that observe a rela 
tionship between a divided labor movement 
and strike frequencies test the suggested 
effect of union competition on aggregated 
data: the strike frequency across an entire 
country. This is questionable because union 
competition seems a phenomenon less likely 
to occur at the national level than at lower 
levels. Collective bargaining and employee 
representation occur mainly at the company 
or sector level. Particularly at the sector 
level, a wide variation in the number of labor 
unions exists. Clegg's suggestion that there is 
an interaction effect between the bargaining 
level and union competition refers implicitly 
to the sector or company level. Furthermore, 
the independent variables are not alone in 
being mainly sector- or company-level phe 
nomena, in this case; strikes are, too, as shown 
by the fact that strike incidence can differ 
significantly between sectors (see Campolieti 
et al. 2005). It is not the federation that calls 
a strike, but the affiliated union. The use of 
aggregated data obscures the level at which 
the proposed explanation of union competi 
tion is to be identified. Wheeler (1984:263) 
argued that "it is not acceptable ... to justify 
a variable on the micro level and measure it 
on the macro level." An empirical test using 
data collected at the actual bargaining level 
therefore holds the promise of providing 
improved accuracy. 
Third, the comparative studies fail to sub 
mit their findings to a statistical test. Until 
the null hypothesis has been thoroughly 
tested, the proposed relation can claim only 
conjectural status. 
In this article, the relationship between 
strike frequencies and multi-unionism is sub 
jected to a statistical test by means of a multi 
level analysis. This enables a determination 
of whether the effect of multi-unionism on 
strike frequency occurs at the national level 
or the sector level, and whether that effect 
is stronger in heterogeneous sectors or in 
homogeneous sectors. 
The studies of multi-unionism in the 
United Kingdom in the 1980s benefited from 
more up-to-date statistical methods; however, 
since a clear characterization of British multi 
unionism is not available, the U.K. case stud 
ies cannot distinguish between substantive 
competition and membership competition. 
International comparative analyses at the 
sector level are therefore required. 
Data and Method 
The main argument of this article is that the 
effect of multi-unionism should be studied at 
the level where bargaining takes place, which 
in this analysis is the sector level. Although 
in some European countries, such as the 
United Kingdom, company-level bargaining 
is dominant, sector-level bargaining is domi 
nant in the Western European countries in 
my sample. In all of these countries, however, 
company-level bargaining also occurs, and 
bargaining at the company or sector level is 
not exclusive; multi-level bargaining is preva 
lent (Traxler et al. 2001 ). Under multi-level 
bargaining, sector-level agreements consist 
of binding or non-binding agreements on 
certain issues that apply to companies, while 
other issues are left for company-level bar 
gaining. Nevertheless, all seven countries 
that are examined in the present study 
have been characterized by various authors 
as countries where sector-level bargaining 
predominates (Traxler et al. 2001; OECD 
2004; ETUI 2007). 
The multi-level comparison of strike fre 
quencies is limited to the seven countries 
presented in Table 2. The limited availabil 
ity of data on the number of unions at the 
sector level reduced not only the number 
of countries the analysis could include, but 
also the number of sectors. Since not every 
sector is present in every selected country, the 
sectors also had to be selected carefully. To 
avoid the problem of missing observations, I 
selected four sectors that were present in all 
seven countries. Also, the public sector was 
deleted from the sample, to avoid problems 
that would arise because of international 
differences in the legal status of strikes by 
civil servants. 
Dependent Variable 
I use strike frequency as the dependent vari 
able. This measure for industrial conflict has 
some serious drawbacks. Several scholars 
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Table 1. Strike Incidence (the Dependent Variable), 1990-2006, by Sector 
(Manufacturing, Construction, Trade, and Transport)3 in Seven Countries. 
Country Manufacturing Construction Trade Transport Total Mean 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Norway 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Austria 
Italy 
Total 
Mean 
8.7 
2.1 
3 
7.8 
33.1 
0.3 
354.1 
409.1 
58.4 
1.5 
0.7 
1.4 
0.4 
0.3 
0 
51.7 
56 
8 
0.8 
0.2 
1.4 
6.9 
3.9 
0 
22.4 
35.5 
5 
5.8 
0.3 
2.9 
6.9 
2.5 
0 
144.6 
163 
23.3 
16.8 
3.3 
8.7 
22 
39.8 
0.3 
572.8 
663.6 
94.8 
4.2 
0.8 
0.5 
5.5 
10 
0.1 
143 
166 
23.7 
Source: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics (1997, 2006) 
aThese sectors correspond with the International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities 
(ISEC-rev.3): Manufacturing corresponds to the ISIC category D, "Manufacturing"; Construction to category F, 
"Construction"; Trade to categories G+H, "Wholesale, Retail Trade, and Hotels and Restaurants"; and Transport 
to category I, "Transport, Storage, and Communication." 
have cited potential methodological prob 
lems arising from differences across coun 
tries in the definition and measurement of 
"strikes" (Edwards and Hyman 1994:252,253; 
Stokke 2001:248). Some countries include 
short strikes in strike statistics, and others do 
not;3 some define strikes to include a range 
of collective actions, and others count only 
official strikes. Therefore, strike duration, 
the number of employees on strike, 
or a com 
bination of those variables, such as working 
days lost to strikes, is generally preferable to 
strike frequency as a measure of strike activ 
ity, especially when the economic or social 
impact of strikes is under investigation.4 
Granted that strike frequency may not be 
the most reliable indicator of industrial con 
flict in international comparisons, however, 
I argue that for the purposes of the present 
study, it is the most valid dependent variable. 
First, a competition-motivated decision to call 
a strike will most likely be reflected in the 
number of strikes. The other indicators are 
3Among my selected countries, this holds for Norway, 
Sweden, and Switzerland. A rather simple solution to 
this problem, proposed by Edward and Hyman (1994), 
would be to omit short strikes for every country. How 
ever, the ILO yearbook only provides aggregated data, 
which makes it impossible to identify individual strikes 
and their duration. 
4However, Hyman (1989:18-19) was also skeptical 
about the reliability of the number of workers involved 
in a strike and working days lost. 
less straightforward, because union leaders 
are less able to control the other character 
istics of a strike: strike duration is mainly 
determined by the resistance of the employer 
(Hicks 1963; Crouch 1982), and the number 
of employees on strike is largely dependent 
on the number of employees, or unionized 
employees, within the sector (Akkerman etal. 
1995). Second, this paper reinvestigates the 
association found in previous international 
comparisons in which strike frequency was 
either the sole dependent variable or one 
of a set of dependent variables. It would be 
impossible to compare previous studies with 
this study if a different dependent variable 
were used. Finally, the problem of the com 
parability of strike frequency is less urgent 
at the sector level than at the national level, 
as will be explained below. 
Strikes are, of course, not the only means 
unions use to force employers to give in to 
their demands. Demonstrations, overtime 
bans, and work-to-rule or "go slow" actions, 
for example, are alternatives to a costly 
strike. Given that unions use alternative 
means of protest, and that competition also 
affects the use of these means, restricting 
the analysis to strikes implies an underes 
timation of the effects of competition on 
industrial conflict. 
I use the statistics on strike frequency pro 
vided by the ILO Yearbook of Labor Statistics 
(1997, 2006), from which data concerning 
the number of strikes in the selected sectors 
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Table 2. Number of Unions in Four Sectors 
(Manufacturing, Construction, Trade, and Transport) in Seven Countries, 1992. 
Country Manufacturing Construction Trade Transport Total Mean 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Norway 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Austria 
Italy 
Total 
Mean 
14 
22 
19 
33 
17 
7 
18 
130 
18.6 
11 
6 
4 
6 
5 
2 
3 
37 
5.3 
9 
10 
7 
14 
6 
1 
3 
50 
7.1 
10 
20 
23 
24 
9 
2 
7 
95 
13.6 
44 
58 
53 
77 
37 
12 
31 
212 
30.3 
11 
14.5 
13.3 
19.3 
9.3 
3 
7.75 
53 
7.5 
Source: Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000). 
within a 17-year period (1990-2006)5 were 
extracted. To mitigate the effects of extreme 
values (such as in Italy), I calculated the log 
of the strike frequencies. 
Table 1 shows huge variance between 
countries, similar to the variance observed by 
international comparative studies. However, 
the variance between sectors also appears 
to be large. Strike incidence is consistently 
higher in the manufacturing and transport 
sectors than in other sectors, indicating that 
sector-level effects may be present. 
Explanatory Variables 
The number of trade unions in a sector is 
used to proxy multi-unionism. The number 
of unions by sector, taken from Ebbinghaus 
and Visser's (2000) database,6 is shown in 
Table 2. 
Control Variables 
The dependent variable, strike frequency, 
is not scale-free and is likely to reflect the size 
of the work force of a nation or sector. To 
exclude the possibility that the relationship 
between the number of unions and strike 
frequency is caused by the size of a sector 
(and therefore the number of potential 
5For some of the more recent years, data collection 
failed for some countries, such as Belgium, because of 
too many missing cases. 
6Unpublished, but made available to the author. 
conflicts), I control for number of employees 
(ILO 1997, 2006) and number of enterprises 
in the sector (OECD 2007). To isolate the 
effect of multi-unionism from the effects of 
the business cycle (Campolieti et al. 2005), 
I also control for employment rate and change 
in GDP (OECD 2007) ? 
The Heterogeneity/ 
Homogeneity of the Sectors 
The hypotheses distinguish between homo 
geneous sectors and heterogeneous sectors. 
This could refer to several characteristics of 
a sector's work force, such as occupation, 
educational level, age, gender, and religious 
or political background. Divisions among 
unions in Europe are based mainly on either 
religious background, political background, 
or occupation. Since information on em 
ployees' religious and political background is 
not available, I focus on an indicator for the 
degree of occupational heterogeneity within 
the work force of a sector: a Gini-Hirschman 
index of occupational heterogeneity.8 This 
measure indicates the standardized number 
7Another relevant control variable is union density. 
Unfortunately, comparable data on union density at the 
sector level are not available for all seven countries in 
the sample. An analysis controlling for union density 
was, however, performed using a smaller data set; for 
the results, see note 11. 
information on the political and religious back 
grounds (of workers) is protected by EU directive 94/46/ 
EG, and processing of this information is prohibited. 
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Table 3. Classification of 
Sector by Degree of Heterogeneity. 
Gini 
Hirschman 
ISIC Sector Index Classification 
D Manufacturing Heterogeneous 
Food 15 Heterogeneous 
Chemicals 16 Heterogeneous 
Metal 15 Heterogeneous 
Other 30 Heterogeneous 
F Construction 6.6 Homogeneous 
G+H Trade Middle 
Trade 8 Homogeneous 
Hotels etc. 27 Heterogeneous 
I Transport Middle 
Transport 5.5 Homogeneous 
Communication 10 Middle 
of occupations in a sector. When occupa 
tions in a work force are concentrated in one 
category, the Gini-Hirschman index equals 
1, indicating an extremely homogeneous 
workforce. The lower the concentration, the 
higher the indicator, and the more heteroge 
neous the work force in terms of the number 
of occupations. This Gini-Hirschman indica 
tor controls for the distribution over occupa 
tional categories within sectors (C?rvers et 
al. 2006). Table 3 shows the Gini-Hirschman 
index for the selected sectors.9 
On the basis of the Gini-Hirschman index, 
the sectors were classified according to their 
degree of heterogeneity. Transport and trade 
are harder to classify than manufacturing and 
construction, because of the diverging levels 
of heterogeneity of the categories within 
these sectors. A finding that the effect of 
the number of unions on strike frequency 
is strongest in manufacturing and weakest 
in construction would be consistent with 
hypothesis I; conversely, a finding that the 
^his indicator is based on a Gini-Hirschman index 
of the occupational composition of Dutch sectors. Since 
the activities in the sectors will be similar in the selected 
countries, I assume that this Gini-Hirschman index is 
a plausible indicator for sectors in all countries in the 
sample. Calculated at the request of the author by the 
Research Center for Education and Labour Market, 
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, 
University of Maastricht. 
effects are strongest in construction and 
weakest in manufacturing would confirm 
hypothesis II. 
Method 
To address the methodological problems 
associated with the international compara 
tive studies discussed, I estimate the effects 
of multi-unionism by means of a multi-level 
analysis.10 This enables me to estimate (a) 
the extent to which strike frequencies dif 
fer between countries and (b) the extent to 
which this can be explained by sector-level 
characteristics. The multi-level analysis also 
partly resolves the reliability issue that arises 
in comparing strike frequencies: we may 
safely assume that the comparison of strikes 
at the sector level is not distorted by differ 
ent methods of measures of strikes, which 
means that making comparisons within 
countries is less problematic (Edwards and 
Hyman 1994:252). I use years as cases for 
each country and sector, which means that 
the cases (years) are nested in countries, 
and in sectors. In order to control for this 
nested structure, I distinguish a third level 
in the multi-level analysis: years. 
Results 
The multi-level analysis generates infor 
mation of three kinds. First, it estimates the 
effect of the explanatory variables, just like an 
ordinary regression. This effect is called the 
fixed effect, which can be evaluated by a t-test. 
Second, it estimates the random effects, or the 
variance. This variance is divided between 
variance at the highest level and variance at 
each lower level. The analysis of the effect 
of multi-unionism on strike frequencies dis 
tinguishes between years at the lowest level, 
sectors at the middle level, and countries at 
the highest level. In an empty model, that is, 
a model without explanatory variables, these 
random effects inform us about the degree 
of variance at the various levels distinguished 
(Snijders and Bosker 1999). The variance at 
the sector level shows how the sectors differ 
10The multi-level analysis was performed with MLwiN 
version 2.02. 
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Table 4. Results of the Multilevel Analysis of the (In) Number of Strikes. 
Variable ModelO Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Fixed Effect 
Constant 
(In) Number of Unions 
Effect with Manufacturing 
(In) Number of Employees 
(In) Number of Enterprises 
% Change in Real GDP 
Unemployment Rate 
Manufacturing (Reference) 
Trade 
Transport 
Construction 
(ln)Num of Unions 
* 
Manufacturing 
(ln)Num of Unions 
* Trade 
(ln)Num of Unions 
* 
Transport 
(ln)Num of Unions 
* Construction 
0.318 (0.69) -2.295 (0.96)*** 
1.242 (0.29)*** 
Random Effect 
Variance at Country Level 
Variance at Sector Level 
Variance at Year Level 
Improvement 
Compared to Model 0 Deviance 
Change in Deviance 
Change in df 
N 
2.964 (1.8)* 
1.643 (0.54)*** 
1.34 (0.10)*** 
1266.63 
3.433 (1.9)** 
0.8412 (0.29)*** 
1.34 (0.10)*** 
1254.2 
12.43*** 
1 
-3.612 (2.9) 
1.35 (0.34)*** 
-0.122 (0.22) 
0.142 (0.26) 
-0.057 (0.05) 
0.121 (0.23) 
2.479 (1.47)* 
0.8962 (0.33)*** 
1.317 (0.11)*** 
1088.59 
178*** 
6 
376 376 326 
-18.35 (2.38)*** 
See Interaction 
-0.091 (0.22) 
1.467 (0.22)*** 
-0.061 (0.05) 
0.127 (0.04)*** 
-.0.092 (2.19) 
2.278 (2.18) 
1.679 (2.22) 
1.422 (0.71)** 
0.179 (0.36) 
0.709 (0.39)** 
0.224 (0.58) 
0(0) 
0.471 (0.16)*** 
1.363 (0.11)*** 
1062.81 
203.82*** 
13 
326 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level (one-tailed tests). 
within countries, whereas the variance at the 
national level shows the differences in strike 
frequencies between countries. The variance 
at the year level shows the differences in 
strike frequencies within the seventeen-year 
time period. The sum of the variance at all 
levels is the total variance in the dependent 
variable. Inserting an explanatory variable 
may cause a change in any of the random 
effects. Finally, the third metric produced 
by the multi-level analysis is the deviance. 
Changes in deviance compared to the empty 
model can be tested by using a x2 test to 
estimate the improvements in the model. 
Table 4 shows the results of the multi-level 
analysis. 
The importance of sector-level factors is 
shown by the results of the empty model. 
This model, which includes no explana 
tory variables, shows the degree to which 
country-level factors and sector-level factors, 
respectively, are responsible for the variance 
in strike frequency. Although variance at 
the national level is higher, the sector-level 
variance accounts for almost one-third of 
the total variance, meaning that sector-level 
factors heavily condition the total variance 
in strike frequency. The variance at the low 
est level?years?is also considerable and 
statistically significant. 
Model 1 investigates the relationship 
between strike frequency and the number 
of labor unions. This parameter appears 
to be significant (p < .01) and confirms the 
expected positive effect of the number of 
unions on strike frequency. The advantage of 
a multi-level analysis over an ordinary regres 
sion analysis is that it also informs us of the 
level at which variance is explained. This will 
answer the question of whether the effect of 
the number of labor unions is a sector-level 
effect or, as suggested by the comparative 
studies, a country-level effect. The key to 
answering this question is the decrease in 
variance at each level. Table 4 shows that 
the variance at the sector level has decreased. 
456 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 
The fact that country-level variance has not 
decreased indicates that differences in strike 
frequencies between countries are not caused 
by the number of unions. The decrease in 
variance at the sector level indicates that the 
number of labor unions does affect strike 
frequency. The improvement of the model, 
based on the decrease in deviance, is statisti 
cally significant (p < .01). 
To rule out the possibility that the relation 
ship found between the number of unions 
and strike frequency is a reflection of sector 
size, in model 2 I control for the number of 
employees and the number of enterprises 
in the sector.11 The beta of both indicators 
for sector size appears not to be statistically 
significant. The same is true of the control 
variables for the business cycle. However, the 
reductions in variance seem to have effects 
at the national level and the year level. This 
indicates that the control variable explains 
differences in strike frequencies between 
countries and years rather than between 
sectors. 
Finally, I test a model (model 3) in which 
the interaction effects between sector and the 
number of unions are included, in order to 
determine whether the impact of the number 
of unions on strike frequency differs across 
the four sectors. This model shows statistically 
significant interaction effects for manufactur 
ing and transport. In the construction and 
trade sectors, the number of unions does not 
seem to affect strike incidence. The variables 
controlling for unemployment rate and 
number of enterprises become statistically 
significant when the analysis also controls for 
sector characteristics, which is to be expected 
since booms and recessions tend to be across 
sectors. The effect of the unemployment 
rate is counter-cyclical, meaning that strike 
1'Controlling for union density resulted in a drop of 
the N from 326 to 120. Union density appeared to be 
significant at the. 10 level (Beta0.02 (0.0013)) in model 2 
and not to have altered the effects of the other variables. 
In model 3, however, following introduction of the sec 
tor and interaction effects, the effect of union density 
dropped to zero, leaving the other variables essentially 
unchanged. The unchanged outcomes for the control 
and explanatory variables after a considerable drop in 
N indicate that the results are fairly stable. 
incidence is higher when unemployment is 
higher. This is a remarkable finding, since 
most (Northern American) studies have 
reported a negative effect (Kaufman 1982; 
McConnell 1990; Franzosi 1995:30), although 
several exceptions have also been found 
(Gramm 1986; Ingram et al. 1993). 
Multi-level analysis leads to two important 
conclusions. First, I have determined this 
effect to be a sector-level effect. Second, 
the number of labor unions appears to have 
an important effect on strike frequency not 
in all sectors, but in two. The effect is larg 
est in manufacturing, a sector classified as 
having the most heterogeneous work force; 
this confirms the findings of British research 
(Dobson 1997). The effect is smaller, though 
still statistically significant, for transport, a 
sector classified as having medium hetero 
geneity. This, combined with the lack of 
the effect of the number of unions in the 
homogeneous construction sector, indi 
cates that multi-unionism is related to the 
heterogeneity of occupational composition 
of the work force within sectors. This find 
ing supports hypothesis I, which states that 
unions compete for primacy in bargaining, 
not for members. Weakening this tentative 
conclusion, however, is the finding that the 
number of unions has no effect in the trade 
sector, a sector that is also classified as having 
medium heterogeneity. 
Conclusion 
This article is aimed at reinvigorating the 
debate on the positive relationship between 
a divided labor movement and strike activity, 
a pattern first observed in international com 
parative research that has, to date, remained 
a puzzle for which no unequivocal explana 
tion have been offered. Preliminary attempts 
to explain this relationship as reflecting a 
tendency of union rivalry to provoke strikes 
have failed to satisfactorily account for per 
sistent anomalies. As a result, research into 
the matter has remained in something of a 
blind alley since the late 1970s. Two short 
comings of research, one methodological and 
the other theoretical, have been responsible 
for the puzzle's longevity. First, the observed 
relationship has never been subjected to a 
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sophisticated statistical test; and second, it 
has wrongly been identified as a national 
level phenomenon, rather than a sector-level 
phenomenon. This article demonstrates that 
the investigation of strikes is more appropri 
ately conducted at the sector level than at 
the national level. 
The results of the statistical test performed 
in this study, using 17 years of strike data from 
four industrial sectors in seven European 
countries, confirm the relationship between 
the number of unions and strike frequency, 
and also show that this relationship is a sector 
level rather than national-level phenomenon. 
The analysis indicates, too, an important 
dimension of inter-sectoral variation: the 
number of unions affects strike frequency in 
sectors with a heterogeneous work force, but 
not in more occupationally homogeneous 
sectors. These findings support the specu 
lation that unions compete for primacy by 
bidding up bargaining claims, with elevated 
strike incidence as a byproduct; not sup 
ported is the claim that unions initiate 
strikes as a propaganda stratagem to attract 
membership from a pool of workers who 
have two or more unions to choose from. 
Although this is an important improve 
ment on previous comparative studies of 
the coincidence of high strike frequencies 
and divided labor movements, the puzzle 
is by no means solved yet, because even an 
investigation at the sector level leaves one 
anomaly unexplained: the trade sector. Al 
though this sector is classified as having me 
dium occupational heterogeneity, it seems 
to exhibit no competition over bargaining 
claims between the unions, or at least none 
that results in industrial conflict. 
Summing up, I see this study as making two 
contributions. The more important of the 
two is the study's demonstration of the value 
of investigating the sector level to identify and 
explain patterns of strike activity, which sug 
gests the advisability of adding a sub-national 
perspective to traditional comparative indus 
trial relations research. Second, although the 
analysis presented here has not definitively 
settled the question of why multi-unionism 
is associated with higher strike incidence, 
it has at least provided some theoretical 
elaboration concerning the dynamics ofthat 
relationship, including the development of 
two testable hypotheses. 
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